by Tan Jie Xin

The petitioners, HEB and HEM, obtained a decree nisi dissolving their marriage on 19.6.2000 under the Law Reform (Marriage and Divorce) Act 1976 [“LRA 1976”]. However, no application was made by either petitioner to convert the decree nisi into a decree absolute, pursuant to Section 61 LRA 1976.

Despite the fact that the marriage legally remained subsisting, the Petitioner Husband [“HEB”] subsequently entered into a second marriage in 2001, and had children from that second union. It was only in January 2025 that the decree nisi was finally made absolute.

HEB then filed an application to backdate the decree absolute to 8.8.2000, contending that the failure to make the decree nisi absolute earlier was merely a technical overview.

The sole issue was whether the Court had the authority to backdate this decree absolute.

The Court had also considered the following sub-issues:

1. Whether the failure to apply for the decree absolute was a procedural error capable of being corrected under the slip rule (Order 20 rule 11 of the Rules of Court 2012); and

2. The legal ramifications of not converting the decree nisi into a decree absolute.

Findings of the Court

The Court held that a marriage remains valid unless and until the decree absolute is granted. Further, the slip rule was not applicable as matters in relation to the decree nisi and absolute are governed by Section 61 and Section 62 LRA 1976. 

The Court also held that its inherent powers cannot be invoked to facilitate a substantive right which is not provided for. To backdate the decree absolute would be an attempt to validate a marriage that would otherwise be null and void under Section 69 LRA 1976, as the first marriage was still in existence at the time.

Further, the Petitioner Husband’s request for the decree nisi to be backdated to 8.8.2000 was found to be inherently flawed. 

The decree nisi was granted on 19.6.2000, meaning the three-month period would only have lapsed on 18.9.2000. To suggest that the decree could be treated as absolute as at 8.8.2000 was therefore factually and legally untenable. The date sought was premature, even by the Petitioner Husband’s own interpretation. 

This was not a mere calculation error, but a reflection of the absence of any sound legal basis for the application, further reinforcing the Court’s conclusion that it was wholly without merit.

The application was dismissed.